# If it happens that it means it's possible



## la italianilla

Hi! Is there anyone that could help me to translate into both Ancient and Modern Greek the following sentence?

If it happens that it means it's possible

It's something that a friend of mine always says and I'd like to write him down on a greeting card in Greek too.

Thanks in advance


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## orthophron

Ciao.



> If it happens that it means it's possible


I could do, but I want to be 100% sure I have understood what you mean.
Maybe if the word "that" was omitted. Can I try without it?

Αν συμβεί αυτό, σημαίνει ότι είναι δυνατό. (modern gr)
Ἂν τι συμβῇ, δῆλον ὅτι δυνατόν. (ancient gr)


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## TheoG

I'm a native English speaker and I don't understand that sentence.  

"If it happens that it means it's possible"

Do you mean, "If it happens than it means it's possible"? 
or
"If it happens, it means it's possible"?


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## la italianilla

Hi everyone 
I traslated it as "If it happens it means that it's possible" but a native English speaker told me the sentence sounds better the way I wrote last day...the only problem was that I forgot a comma and used the second _it_ that was redundant! You can read it here 

_If it happens, that it means it's possible._

is the correct sentence 



> wonderment also told me:
> 
> εἰ συμβαίνει γιγνέσθαι σημαίνει ἐξεῖναι. (Ancient Greek)



in here.

Do you agree?
Thanks for your help!


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## orthophron

Well, if my memory serves me correctly "εξείναι" means "to be natural, normal", while "ενείναι" means "to be possible" (to be capable of being realized, achievable). I do not remember the original meaning of "σημαίνει" and what is more I cannot refer to my library at the moment since I'm on h o l i d a y ! 

PS. I do not have polytonic fonts here either


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## la italianilla

Thanks for your help, orthophron


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## wonderment

orthophron said:


> Ἂν τι συμβῇ, δῆλον ὅτι δυνατόν. (ancient gr)



Ancient Greek conditions are actually quite complex in their variation; there is _none_ in which the protasis is introduced by ἄν. According to Liddell and Scott, _the_ authoritative Ancient Greek lexicon, συμβῇ is not an Ancient Greek verb. 



orthophron said:


> Well, if my memory serves me correctly "εξείναι" means "to be natural, normal", while "ενείναι" means "to be possible" (to be capable of being realized, achievable). I do not remember the original meaning of "σημαίνει" and what is more I cannot refer to my library at the moment since I'm on h o l i d a y !



Well...let's check with Liddell and Scott online :

ἐξεῖναι: infinitive in indirect statement, from a verb that means "it is possible"; it does _not_ mean "to be natural, normal."

σημαίνει: to signify, mean, indicate


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## modus.irrealis

wonderment said:


> Ancient Greek conditions are actually quite complex in their variation; there is _none_ in which the protasis is introduced by ἄν.


ἄν though is a possible contraction of ἐάν, which I think is a better choice in general.



> According to Liddell and Scott, _the_ authoritative Ancient Greek lexicon, συμβῇ is not an Ancient Greek verb.


But it's the aorist subjunctive of συμβαίνει.

Comparing the two translations (by wonderment and orthophron) makes we wonder about which conditional construction would be more usual with a sentence like this. I know that both the εἰ + indicative and ἐάν + subjunctive are used in the protasis of general statements concerning the present, but I'm not quite sure what difference (if any) there is between them in this usage and which one's more appropriate here. Smyth's grammar is a little unclear to me on this point -- he seems to say that the construction with the subjunctive is similar to "if ever it happens", which I don't think is what la italianilla is looking for, but on the other hand says that the construction with the indicative is "less frequent" in this usage.


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## wonderment

modus.irrealis said:


> ἄν though is a possible contraction of ἐάν, which I think is a better choice in general.


I'm sorry for the oversight. I quickly scanned Chase and Phillip's table of conditions (which looks like Smyth's) which neglect to note that ἄν and ἤν are alternative forms for ἐάν, and I simply forgot. 



> But it's the aorist subjunctive of συμβαίνει.


Yes, but I was expecting a simple condition: εἰ + present indicative (protasis), present indicative (apodosis). In the present tense συμβῇ does not register. 



> Comparing the two translations (by wonderment and orthophron) makes we wonder about which conditional construction would be more usual with a sentence like this. I know that both the εἰ + indicative and ἐάν + subjunctive are used in the protasis of general statements concerning the present, but I'm not quite sure what difference (if any) there is between them in this usage and which one's more appropriate here. Smyth's grammar is a little unclear to me on this point -- he seems to say that the construction with the subjunctive is similar to "if ever it happens", which I don't think is what la italianilla is looking for, but on the other hand says that the construction with the indicative is "less frequent" in this usage.


Well, "less frequent" doesn't make the construction wrong or rare. "If ever it happens" (a general condition, ἐάν + subjunctive) is not quite the same as "if it happens" (a particular condition, εἰ + indicative). Anyway, even if you allow for the present general condition, orthophon's phrasing does not really fit. Look at the entry for συμβαίνω (at A III), and you will see this exact phrasing (ἄν τι συμβῇ); it's a euphemism for "if ever anything evil happens." I don't think it's what la italianilla has in mind.


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## la italianilla

Hi. Sorry fot the misunderstanding I created...
My friend always uses that sentence in order to say that if things that seem to be impossible do happen, then it means those things are not so impossible as we thought...
I hope it's clearer now...


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## modus.irrealis

wonderment said:


> Well, "less frequent" doesn't make the construction wrong or rare.


I didn't say it was wrong -- in fact I think both translations are clearly grammatically correct -- I'm just wondering about the nuances of each and which is more applicable here -- basically, since my experience has been that for general conditions, it is the ἐάν + subjunctive that is normally used, when would the εἰ + indicative construction have been used for general statements? Smyth mentions that it's usually used with a form of τις, and some other sources speak about thing like "fulfillability" and "probability" but that's not all that meaningful to me. 



> "If ever it happens" (a general condition, ἐάν + subjunctive) is not quite the same as "if it happens" (a particular condition, εἰ + indicative).


But I don't read la italianilla's sentence as being a particular condition -- in fact I can't think of a non-future context where "if it happens" would have a particular meaning. I can think of things like "If it happens, you're in trouble" where the "it" refers to something specific, but these seem to be cases of the present being used for the future as well, i.e. it's the same as "you're going to be in trouble."



> Anyway, even if you allow for the present general condition, orthophon's phrasing does not really fit. Look at the entry for συμβαίνω (at A III), and you will see this exact phrasing (ἄν τι συμβῇ); it's a euphemism for "if ever anything evil happens." I don't think it's what la italianilla has in mind.


I agree with that, although I don't think it has to have that meaning (in English "if anything happens" can also mean "if anything bad happens") -- it's just not exactly what la italianilla wrote.

About the apodosis, L&S seems to indicate that σημαίνω takes ὅτι rather than the accusative + infinitive. The aspect of the infinitive is a little harder to be sure about, but I would think the aorist γενέσθαι fits better in this context than the present γίγνεσθαι.


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## wonderment

modus.irrealis said:


> I didn't say it was wrong -- in fact I think both translations are clearly grammatically correct -- I'm just wondering about the nuances of each and which is more applicable here -- basically, since my experience has been that for general conditions, it is the ἐάν + subjunctive that is normally used, when would the εἰ + indicative construction have been used for general statements?



I still think that "ἄν τι συμβῇ, δῆλον ὅτι δυνατόν" is not the right translation for: “If it happens, that means it’s possible.” 

Again, I read la italianilla’s sentence as a present simple condition which takes the form:  εἰ + present indicative (protasis), present indicative (apodosis).

From Smyth: “This form of condition [i.e. the simple condition] corresponds to the logical formula *if this is so, then that is so; if this is not so, then that is not so; if A = B, then C = D.* The truth of the conclusion depends solely on the truth of the condition, which is not implied in any way. In these conditions something is supposed to be true only in order to draw the consequence that something else is true.” 

I think you may be confusing the present simple condition with the present general condition (ἐάν + subjunctive, present indicative). 

The distinction between _particular_ and _general_ conditions is made by Smyth, Goodwin (at section 1387) and others. It corresponds to the distinction between the simple condition (εἰ + indicative = if it happens...) and the present general condition (ἐάν + subjunctive = if it ever happens... Here, there’s a degree of probability in the supposition, hence the subjunctive mood). Smyth sees the supposition in the particular condition as being more “definite”.

In effect: εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens
ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens  (ἄν τι συμβῇ = if ever anything bad happens)​


> when would the εἰ + indicative construction have been used for general statements? Smyth mentions that it's usually used with a form of τις, and some other sources speak about thing like "fulfillability" and "probability" but that's not all that meaningful to me.



Smyth is citing a specific instance in which the simple condition takes on an aspect of a general condition: “When the protasis has εἴ τις and the apodosis a present indicative, the simple condition has a double meaning referring both to an individual case and to a rule of action.” The addition of an indefinite pronoun (τις, τι) makes the protasis of the simple condition, well, less definite (or particular): εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens vs. εἴ τι συμβαίνει = if anything happens. Smyth goes on to note explicitly that “when a present general condition is distinctly expressed, ἐάν with the subjunctive is used.” (ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens)



> About the apodosis, L&S seems to indicate that σημαίνω takes ὅτι rather than the accusative + infinitive.


I'm not so certain. In indirect discourse, verbs of mental action and some of saying take the infinitive with subject accusative construction. Most verbs of saying take the ὅτι or ὡς construction. I think you're right (though the limited examples in L&S are far from exhaustive of what's possible in terms of usage); σημαίνει ὅτι ἔξεστι would be better.



> The aspect of the infinitive is a little harder to be sure about, but I would think the aorist γενέσθαι fits better in this context than the present γίγνεσθαι.



Have a look at the entry for σημαίνω in L&S. A III 3b gives σημαίνει γίγνεσθαι for "it turns out/ happens to be."


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## modus.irrealis

In Smyth's (perhaps unfortunate) terminology, though, "general" has two meanings. In one sense, it refers to the "function" of the conditional clause:

2293. A particular condition refers to a definite act or to several definite acts occurring at a definite time or at definite times.

2294. A general condition refers to any one of a series of acts that may occur or may have occurred at any time.

Here "general" is opposed to "particular."

But "general" is also used as a formal category (in the present for ἐάν + subjunctive, present indicative) which is opposed to "simple" as well as other formal categories. "Simple" though can be used for both particular and general "functions":

2298. c. The simple condition is particular or general.

It's clear to me that la italianilla's sentece is general in terms of "function" -- especially after her last explanation where she rephrases it as about "things that seem to be impossible."

Now Smyth mentions in various places that for general statements, ἐάν + subjunctive is more common, and in my experience it is much more common, so my question remains, when would the simple form have been used for general statements. Maybe it was just a stylistic variation with no other implications. Now, I'm not saying that using the "simple" form is wrong in this case -- I do think the ἐάν + subjunctive is the default choice and that εἰ + indicative is a possible alternative, but my question remains, under what conditions is it an alternative.



wonderment said:


> Again, I read la italianilla’s sentence as a present simple condition which takes the form:  εἰ + present indicative (protasis), present indicative (apodosis).


It's unclear to me what you're saying, here. "simple" refers to a classification of Greek conditional sentences by form. English has no such distinction, since it simply uses the indicative in all sorts of conditional clauses. As I said above, it seems clear that la italianilla's sentence is a general condition according to function so a priori it could be translated as either a present general condition or a present simple condition.



> From Smyth: “This form of condition [i.e. the simple condition] corresponds to the logical formula *if this is so, then that is so; if this is not so, then that is not so; if A = B, then C = D.* The truth of the conclusion depends solely on the truth of the condition, which is not implied in any way. In these conditions something is supposed to be true only in order to draw the consequence that something else is true.”


I find this misleading, because I don't see how this doesn't apply to the example of general statements he gives. It's worse that he speaks of "logical", because in my experience mathematical works use ἐάν + subjunctive for general conditions, for example, in Book 1 of Euclid's Elements.



> The distinction between _particular_ and _general_ conditions is made by Smyth, Goodwin (at section 1387) and others. It corresponds to the distinction between the simple condition (εἰ + indicative = if it happens...) and the present general condition (ἐάν + subjunctive = if it ever happens... Here, there’s a degree of probability in the supposition, hence the subjunctive mood). Smyth sees the supposition in the particular condition as being more “definite”.


But as I showed above, simple is opposed to general only in the formal sense, but not in the function sense.



> In effect:εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens
> ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens  (ἄν τι συμβῇ = if ever anything bad happens)​


I disagree here -- "ever" is Smyth's way of indicating general statements according to function (and maybe English has changed since his day and "ever" didn't have the same implications of "distance" for him as it does for me). In section, 2342 he translates general statements using the simple form with "ever" as well.



> Smyth is citing a specific instance in which the simple condition takes on an aspect of a general condition: “When the protasis has εἴ τις and the apodosis a present indicative, the simple condition has a double meaning referring both to an individual case and to a rule of action.” The addition of an indefinite pronoun (τις, τι) makes the protasis of the simple condition, well, less definite (or particular): εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens vs. εἴ τι συμβαίνει = if anything happens. Smyth goes on to note explicitly that “when a present general condition is distinctly expressed, ἐάν with the subjunctive is used.” (ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens)


But look at section 2342: "the protasis usually has εἴ τις, εἴ τι with the indicative" and all the "ever"s in his translations as I mentioned above.




> Have a look at the entry for σημαίνω in L&S. A III 3b gives σημαίνει γίγνεσθαι for "it turns out/ happens to be."


You mean in the entry for συμβαίνω, right? That means I misread your translation since I took γίγνεσθαι with ἐξεῖναι. I'll have to think about this but why not use σημβαίνει alone, since that can certainly mean "occur." In L&S's "*turns out* to be, i.e. *consequently* or *inevitably is* or *happens" *happens sticks out because I don't see how it means what the other three mean, but it doesn't seem to mean "occur" in this case.


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## modus.irrealis

modus.irrealis said:


> I find this misleading, because I don't see how this doesn't apply to the example of general statements he gives. It's worse that he speaks of "logical", because in my experience mathematical works use ἐάν + subjunctive for general conditions, for example, in Book 1 of Euclid's Elements.


On second look, many of those ἐάν + subjunctive are used with the future indicative in the apodosis, although many are with present indicative, and there seem to be no examples of εἰ + indicative. It seems to me that this "logical" quality does not seem to be limited to the simple forms of conditional clauses.


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## wonderment

“If it happens, that means it’s possible.” The implication is that seemingly impossible things do happen; therefore, they’re possible. Put another way, seemingly impossible things are possible because they _do_ happen, rather than because they _may_ happen. This is my understanding of la italianilla’s sentence. And the nuances of this distinction affects my choice of the simple condition (εἰ + present indicative) over the present general condition (ἐάν + subjunctive). That "ἐάν + subjunctive" is more common than "εἰ + present indicative" is irrelevant to me. My concern is with italianilla’s specific sentence and what is the most apt Greek construction to translate the nuances of that English sentence. 



modus.irrealis said:


> In Smyth's (perhaps unfortunate) terminology, though, "general" has two meanings. In one sense, it refers to the "function" of the conditional clause:
> 
> 2293. A particular condition refers to a definite act or to several definite acts occurring at a definite time or at definite times.
> 
> 2294. A general condition refers to any one of a series of acts that may occur or may have occurred at any time.
> 
> Here "general" is opposed to "particular."



According to these criteria, I would classify italianilla’s sentence as a “particular condition” because we are talking about “seemingly impossible things that _do_ happen” rather than “seemingly impossible things that _may_ happen.” 

I don’t think you can blithely dissociate form from function. Smyth immediately goes on to give specific examples correlating these “functions” with their respective forms; “general conditions” correlate with:

present general condition: (protasis) ἐάν + subjunctive, (apodosis) present indicative
past general condition: (protasis) εἰ + optative, (apodosis) imperfect indicative​I don’t know why Smyth doesn’t give an example of “a particular condition” to correspond with the “simple condition.” But Goodwin (at section 1387) helps to complete the picture, correlating the “particular condition” with:

simple condition: (protasis) εἰ + indicative, (apodosis) indicative.​It seems clear to me that la itanilla’s sentence is “particular” in funtion and a “present simple condition” in form. Form and funtion are inextricably linked here. 



> so my question remains, when would the simple form have been used for general statements.



The answer is at Smyth 2298: “When the protasis has εἴ τις and the apodosis a present indicative, the simple condition has a double meaning referring both to an individual case and to a rule of action.” The addition of an indefinite pronoun (τις, τι) makes the protasis of the simple condition less definite or particular and more general: εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens vs. εἴ τι συμβαίνει = if anything (ever) happens. 

Again, at 2342 when he discusses the specific instances when the simple condition (form) takes on a general aspect (function): when the protasis has εἴ τις or εἴ τι with the indicative. He is basically repeating 2298. And yes, he does use “ever” to translate these sentences that are technically simple conditions in form, BUT only if they begin with εἴ τις or εἴ τι (i.e. only if they take this particular form), and that’s to be expected because of the qualifications described in 2298. I have not seen the word “ever” used to translate a present simple condition that is not introduced by εἴ τις or εἴ τι. 

In effect: ("ever" has the indefinite temporal sense of "at any time")
εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens (it would be extremely odd to use “ever” here) 
εἴ τι συμβαίνει = if anything (ever) happens
ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens 
ἐάν τι συμβῇ = if anything bad (ever) happens ​


> But look at section 2342: "the protasis usually has εἴ τις, εἴ τι with the indicative" and all the "ever"s in his translations as I mentioned above.


Look at the title of this section: “Indicative Form of General Conditions.” You could re-title it in part as “when simple condition form is used for general statements” because that’s what he discusses. And his discussion repeats 2298. He is not at all saying that the protasis of simple conditions usually have εἴ τις, εἴ τι with the indicative.  



> You mean in the entry for συμβαίνω, right? That means I misread your translation since I took γίγνεσθαι with ἐξεῖναι. I'll have to think about this but why not use σημβαίνει alone, since that can certainly mean "occur." In L&S's "*turns out* to be, i.e. *consequently* or *inevitably is* or *happens" *happens sticks out because I don't see how it means what the other three mean, but it doesn't seem to mean "occur" in this case.



Yes, I meant συμβαίνω and you can take γίγνεσθαι with both συμβαίνω and ἔξεστι: “If it happens to be, that means it’s possible (to be).” Why γίγνεσθαι (which has here the sense of “to take place” or “come to pass”)? Because ἔξεστι is often followed by an infinitive, and to give the sentence an existential nuance, to affirm the existence of a thing.


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## orthophron

Hi.
Many thanks for the opportunity you give me in the middle of … the aegean to have a “linguistic” break.
Thanks for the pointers indeed (γηράσκω γάρ ἀεί διδασκόμενος -> I grow old constantly learning more). I think I'm beggining to learn english too.

Well I actually found the phrase «ἂν τι συμβῇ» as an ephemism for «ἂν τι κακόν συμβῇ» though I do not think it loses completely its general meaning (*). I do not know if by saying “ὃ ἂν συμβῇ...” (relative-conditional), I could have saved the day either.

But nevertheless, now that I have understood that what we're going to translate is something like “what/anything happens is possible” (isn’t it?) I think it might be possible to eliminate completely the need of conditional.

Let’s examine a bit the wonderment's suggestion: "εἰ συμβαίνει γιγνέσθαι σημαίνει ἐξεῖναι".

All I ‘d do is a little change. “τό συμβαίνειν γίγνεσθαι σημαίνει τό ἐξεῖναι” (to happen to occur means to be possible [to occur]), according to the saying:«τό θέλειν ἐστί καί δύνασθαι» -> if you want, you can. ("δύνασθαι" is predicative here)
infinitive preceded by an article is equivalent to a noun.

“σημαίνει”. Can be used with object in accusative. Its object is "το ἐξείναι" while its subject is “τό συμβαίνειν γίγνεσθαι”. The hypothetic clause cannot be the subject here, so I replaced the "if statement" with infinitive preceded by an article.

“ἐξείναι”. It is still "verbal" and being always impersonal needs infinitive as subject, which is of course implied (γίγνεσθαι). 

“συμβαίνειν γίγνεσθαι” is ok (use of “συμβαίνει”as impersonal with “γίγνεσθαι”as subject).

In the meantime we could discuss other possibilities. Summer can wait! I don’t know if italianilla’s friend can … 

ὃ συμβαίνει/γίγνεται, [δῆλόν ἐστι ὃτι] δυνατόν ἐστι. -> what happens, [it is clear that it] is possible.
ὃ συμβαίνει δηλοῖ ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστι. -> what happens makes it clear that it is possible.
ὃ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, έξεστι [γίγνεσθαι]. ("ὃ" is in accusative here) - > what happens to occur is possible [to occur].

If the "happening" has no duration we can use "γενέσθαι" instead of "γίγνεσθαι".

Fellows?

___________________________________________________________________
Oh! I almost forgot it. 
modern greek free translation : ό,τι συμβαίνει είναι φυσιολογικό.

__________________________
(*) The 5th form of condition in Smyth's Grammar expresses a general condition; refers to an act that is / will be continued in present / future. I think it would be nice to substitute "whenever" or "every time" for "αν" to translate it. 
"Whenever something happens we realize that it is just possible". This is the idea I grasped at the beginning. 
_______________________
There is an example in Scott’s involving “συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι” meaning “happen to be” but again I don't think "γίγνεσθαι" abolishes the sense of "occur".
__________________________
To have multi-accent greek words displayed, you set font "palatino" in this forum's editor. WinXP includes this font.


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## Outsider

wonderment said:


> “If it happens, that means it’s possible.” The implication is that seemingly impossible things do happen; therefore, they’re possible. Put another way, seemingly impossible things are possible because they _do_ happen, rather than because they _may_ happen. This is my understanding of la italianilla’s sentence. [...]
> 
> According to these criteria, I would classify italianilla’s sentence as a “particular condition” because we are talking about “seemingly impossible things that _do_ happen” rather than “seemingly impossible things that _may_ happen.”
> 
> [...]
> 
> The answer is at Smyth 2298: “When the protasis has εἴ τις and the apodosis a present indicative, the simple condition has a double meaning referring both to an individual case and to a rule of action.” The addition of an indefinite pronoun (τις, τι) makes the protasis of the simple condition less definite or particular and more general: εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens vs. εἴ τι συμβαίνει = if anything (ever) happens.


I tend to agree with Wonderment's analysis (to the extent that I'm able to follow it), but I would explain it a bit differently. Italianilla's sentence means:

If _a particular thing_ happens, then that thing is possible.

Of course, the "particular thing" here is arbitrary -- it's a placeholder --, but formally we are still talking about a particular event, rather than a member of a class of events. 

Does this help?


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## modus.irrealis

Wonderment, just to clear something up: are you saying that not only is εἰ + indicative a better rendition of the la italianilla's sentence, but it is also the only one? If that's so I think we should settle that first, which means deciding whether the sentence has a particular or general function.



wonderment said:


> According to these criteria, I would classify italianilla’s sentence as a “particular condition” because we are talking about “seemingly impossible things that _do_ happen” rather than “seemingly impossible things that _may_ happen.”


Why? What "definite" act is referred to by the "it happens" in the sentence? The answer is to none, since even under your own interpretation, "it" refers to any of the class of "seemingly impossible things that _do_ happen." The very fact that you rephrased the sentence using plurals means that there is no definite act in mind. And referring to a class of things is a clear sign of being a general condition.

And furthermore, in English, "happen" is a non-stative verb, so the simple present must have a general meaning (unless it refers to the future, the past, or is an example of play-by-play commentary -- none of which apply here). To have a definite meaning, it would be "it's happening" (which by the way is the closest equivalent to εἰ συμβαίνει, especially when it has a particular meaning). When it comes after "if", nothing changes that.

If anything, la italianilla's sentence is very similar to mathematical statements -- in fact, it basically boils down to the logical truth that "does happen" implies "may happen." And mathematical statements in Greek often use ἐάν + subjunctive:

ἐὰν ἴσοις ἴσα προστεθῇ, τὰ ὅλα ἐστὶν ἴσα
if equals are added to equals, the wholes are equal

What is different about this sentence compared to la italianilla's?

I'll also use this example to disagree with Outsider as well -- here the sentence is about adding together two particular, but arbitrary, pairs of equals, but it's the arbitrariness that makes this a general statement rather than something about some definite object. I find the terminology used in the grammars confusing because they use terms that have various meanings and often use them with different meanings in different places and I think that's the case here with "particular" which I don't think is meant the way Outsider used in his post, because if it did I don't see how τις "a certain" could be used with ἐάν + subjunctive, as in

ἢν δέ τις το τούτων τι παραβαίνῃ, ζημίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπέθεσαν
but if any one transgresses any one of these regulations, they impose punishment on him

Here too, if a law is transgressed there is a particular person (or persons) who transgressed it, but it's still a general statement.


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## Outsider

I feel like a blind man entering a discussion about colour, since I don't know any Greek, but I can't resist another comment.

Using the subjunctive in those kinds of sentences does not seem strange to me at all -- though I wouldn't say that it's the only option, either. In Portuguese one could do the same. Of course, Portuguese is not Greek by any means, but perhaps this gives me a licence to try and explain the rationale behind the use of the subjunctive in those types of sentences. I hope so.



modus.irrealis said:


> If anything, la italianilla's sentence is very similar to mathematical statements -- in fact, it basically boils down to the logical truth that "does happen" implies "may happen." And mathematical statements in Greek often use ἐάν + subjunctive:
> 
> ἐὰν ἴσοις ἴσα προστεθῇ, τὰ ὅλα ἐστὶν ἴσα
> if equals are added to equals, the wholes are equal
> 
> What is different about this sentence compared to la italianilla's?
> 
> I'll also use this example to disagree with Outsider as well -- here the sentence is about adding together two particular, but arbitrary, pairs of equals, but it's the arbitrariness that makes this a general statement rather than something about some definite object. I find the terminology used in the grammars confusing because they use terms that have various meanings and often use them with different meanings in different places and I think that's the case here with "particular" which I don't think is meant the way Outsider used in his post, because if it did I don't see how τις "a certain" could be used with ἐάν + subjunctive, as in
> 
> ἢν δέ τις το τούτων τι παραβαίνῃ, ζημίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπέθεσαν
> but if any one transgresses any one of these regulations, they impose punishment on him
> 
> Here too, if a law is transgressed there is a particular person (or persons) who transgressed it, but it's still a general statement.


For the first sentence you use as an example, I believe the subjunctive would have been possible even in ancient English, would it not?

If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal.​In both sentences, the action described in the protasis is contingent. The speaker in the first is not stating that equals are being added to equals as a matter of fact; he is merely saying what would/will follow as a consequence, _should_ equals be added to equals. A latent uncertainty remains about whether this act will be performed / is being performed, or not.

In the second sentence, the writer or speaker is not asserting that someone will trangress the regulations; he is merely saying what will be the consequences, _should_ anyone transgress the regulations. It's not certain that anyone will transgress them...

I can see a (possible) difference between those examples and Italianilla's sentence. I think the issue comes down to whether we regard the meaning of "If it happens, that means it's true" to be closer to:

1) Should "it" happen, then you will know that it's true.
or
2) If you [already] know that "it" happens, then it's true.​I think that Italianilla's sentence corresponds more to interpretation (2) than to interpretation (1).

The distinction between the two is subtle, but the idea is that in the first case the speaker is not committing himself either way to whether "it will happen" or not. He is merely stating the consequences of such a possibility. While in the second sentence the speaker nearly takes the protasis _as a given_; he's nearly asserting it, along with the implication. There is little doubt in his mind that "it" [something] "will happen" or "does happen".

Even if my reading is incorrect, perhaps it will help you and Wonderment to clarify your ideas on the matter...


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## modus.irrealis

Outsider said:


> For the first sentence you use as an example, I believe the subjunctive would have been possible even in ancient English, would it not?


It was possible, since I've seen it translated that way. But can you say that the subjunctive is not possible in la italianilla's sentence? I'm not a native speaker of an English where the present subjunctive is possible in conditional clauses, so I have no intuition. Some googling found

"if it exist independent of our perception it may exist independent of the perception of other created beings"

in this book, which seems similar to la italianilla's sentence.

I'm in a bit of a rush so a just a few comments -- it seems that you're letting "it" mean different things in different places. I read it in la italianilla's sentence, like you did in your earlier post, as a variable representing an arbitrary something, which is how most people seem to be reading it since people have paraphrased the sentence using plural terms (just like "a bachelor is male" and "bachelors are male" are both general statements). But then you say that the speaker is almost asserting that "it does happen" but what does it mean to assert that when "it" refers to an arbitrary something?

Take the sentence "since it happens, it's possible" which seems to fit your interpretation of la italianilla's sentence -- there "it" has a definite reference -- it cannot be read as an arbitrary something, i.e. it does not mean "since something happens, it's possible."

And a comment about Greek -- the indicative in conditional clauses in Greek does not indicate that you're implying any sort of increased likelihood. At best the indicative is neutral in this respect, often it implies scepticism, and in contrary-to-fact conditionals, it's the indicative that's used for events that have not been/are not fulfilled (unlike many Romance languages).


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## wonderment

modus.irrealis said:


> And a comment about Greek -- the indicative in conditional clauses in Greek does not indicate that you're implying any sort of increased likelihood. At best the indicative is neutral in this respect, often it implies scepticism, and in contrary-to-fact conditionals, it's the indicative that's used for events that have not been/are not fulfilled (unlike many Romance languages).


I disagree completely. Let’s look at the structure of Greek conditions:
present contrary-to-fact: εἱ + imperfect indicative (protasis), imperfect indicative + ἄν (apodosis)
past contrary to fact: εἱ + aorist indicative (protasis), imperfect indicative + ἄν (apodosis) ​The indicative by itself does not imply skepticism; rather it indicates a statement of fact. It is the particle ἄν that marks the condition as contrary to fact; without it, you would be left with a simple condition. In Latin, the subjunctive takes over the function of ἄν.


> I find the terminology used in the grammars confusing because they use terms that have various meanings and often use them with different meanings in different places and I think that's the case here with "particular" which I don't think is meant the way Outsider used in his post, because if it did I don't see how τις "a certain" could be used with ἐάν + subjunctive, as in
> 
> ἢν δέ τις το τούτων τι παραβαίνῃ, ζημίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπέθεσαν
> but if any one transgresses any one of these regulations, they impose punishment on him
> 
> Here too, if a law is transgressed there is a particular person (or persons) who transgressed it, but it's still a general statement.


Τις, τι is an _indefinite_ pronoun; not “a certain”, but anyone, anything, someone, something. It makes the present general condition even more general, less particular, less definite. I also agree with Outsider’s observation “that the writer or speaker is not asserting that someone will trangress the regulations; he is merely saying what will be the consequences, _should_ anyone transgress the regulations. It's not certain that anyone will transgress them...”



> Wonderment, just to clear something up: are you saying that not only is εἰ + indicative a better rendition of the la italianilla's sentence, but it is also the only one? If that's so I think we should settle that first, which means deciding whether the sentence has a particular or general function.


In my own words, given the choice between the simple condition (εἰ + indicative) and the present general condition (ἐάν + subjunctive), I would opt for the former. It seems to me more apt for conveying the nuances of la italianilla’s sentence as I understand it. No, it's not "the only one", just one I'm willing to argue for.


> Why? What "definite" act is referred to by the "it happens" in the sentence? The answer is to none, since even under your own interpretation, "it" refers to any of the class of "seemingly impossible things that _do_ happen." The very fact that you rephrased the sentence using plurals means that there is no definite act in mind. And referring to a class of things is a clear sign of being a general condition.


One way by which Smyth distinguishes between particular and general “functions” is the use of the indefinite pronoun (2298--deja vu pas plus! ). The presence of the indefinite pronoun makes a sentence more general in terms of “function”: 

if it happens = εἰ συμβαίνει
if anything ever happens = ἐάν τι συμβῇ

As I see it, “it” is more definite than “anything”, and la italianilla wrote “if it happens...” not “if anything happens.” What is more, this “it” refers not to just anything, but to something more definite, namely the “seemingly impossible things”. The use of the plural doesn’t negate the definite “it” for me: Smyth 2293 “A particular condition refers to a definite act or to several definite acts occurring at a definite time or at definite times.”

There is another very nuanced way in which la italianilla’s sentence is “definite” (i.e. particular rather than general in function). As Outsider explained it so lucidly, let me just borrow his words: 



Outsider said:


> I think the issue comes down to whether we regard the meaning of "If it happens, that means it's true" to be closer to:
> 
> 1) Should "it" happen, then you will know that it's true.
> or
> 2) If you [already] know that "it" happens, then it's true.​I think that Italianilla's sentence corresponds more to interpretation (2) than to interpretation (1).
> 
> The distinction between the two is subtle, but the idea is that in the first case the speaker is not committing himself either way to whether "it will happen" or not. He is merely stating the consequences of such a possibility. While in the second sentence the speaker nearly takes the protasis _as a given_; he's nearly asserting it, along with the implication. There is little doubt in his mind that "it" [something] "will happen" or "does happen".


It’s also significant that Smyth uses the word “ever” to translate the subtle difference between the simple condition and present general condition, which is also the difference between the indicative and the subjunctive:

εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens
ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens 

This suggests to me that the indicative is not “neutral” vis-a-vis the subjunctive in these conditions; an act seems more "definite" in the indicative.  


> And furthermore, in English, "happen" is a non-stative verb, so the simple present must have a general meaning (unless it refers to the future, the past, or is an example of play-by-play commentary -- none of which apply here). To have a definite meaning, it would be "it's happening" (which by the way is the closest equivalent to εἰ συμβαίνει, especially when it has a particular meaning). When it comes after "if", nothing changes that.


Honestly, I don't think even Smyth himself or the ancient grammarians for that matter had this understanding of "general" in mind when they wrote their tomes.


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## modus.irrealis

wonderment said:


> I disagree completely. Let’s look at the structure of Greek conditions:present contrary-to-fact: εἱ + imperfect indicative (protasis), imperfect indicative + ἄν (apodosis)
> past contrary to fact: εἱ + aorist indicative (protasis), imperfect indicative + ἄν (apodosis)​


Just so that no one is misled by that, I have to mention that these are not the only possibilities -- the imperfect indicative in the protasis can be used for the past, and the aorist indicative + ἄν used in the apodosis for the past, not to mention that the pluperfect can be used as well.​


> The indicative by itself does not imply skepticism; rather it indicates a statement of fact. It is the particle ἄν that marks the condition as contrary to fact; without it, you would be left with a simple condition. In Latin, the subjunctive takes over the function of ἄν.


The point, however, was that it is the indicative that it used -- Latin replaces the plain indicative in the protasis with a subjunctive as well. And it is not true that you have to have ἄν to mark the construction as contrary to fact -- anything that implies unreality can be used in the apodosis (and as far as I can tell, these all use the indicative).

And besides, read again what I wrote: "the indicative in conditional clauses in Greek does not indicate that you're implying any sort of increased likelihood. At best the indicative is neutral in this respect, often it implies scepticism, and in contrary-to-fact conditionals." I said it often implies scepticism, which is true, and that if you think there's some nuance here implying that "it happens" is being asserted, you would not argue that the indicative in Greek manages to do that, unless you were simple-mindedly equating Greek moods with English moods.

Here's what Rijksbaron writes in "The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical Greek". About εἰ + indicative:



> No indication is given concerning the likelihood of fulfilment of the condition.
> ...
> _Note 2_ The use of the indicative often suggests a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker concerning the fulfilment of the condition.


And on ἐάν + subjunctive used with a general present indicative in the apodosis:



> The condition is repeatedly fulfilled, in that every repetition of the state of affairs of the protasis involves a repetition of the state of affairs of the apodosis.
> ...
> _Note 2_ Here were are no longer dealing with a strict hypothesis: real events are referred to, though events which _sometimes_ occur in the situation at hand;


So, indicative can sometimes imply scepticism, while the subjunctive refers to real events. I don't fully agree with his conclusions, but he argues the exact opposite of what you do.



> Τις, τι is an _indefinite_ pronoun; not “a certain”, but anyone, anything, someone, something. It makes the present general condition even more general, less particular, less definite. I also agree with Outsider’s observation “that the writer or speaker is not asserting that someone will trangress the regulations; he is merely saying what will be the consequences, _should_ anyone transgress the regulations. It's not certain that anyone will transgress them...”


Oh noes, I didn't list every meaning of τις -- and τις is how you say "a certain" in Greek:

ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι᾽ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα

translated by Jowett as

 Men of Athens, this reputation  of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess.

So your claim is that in la italianilla's sentence, it is being asserted that "it will happen" (all of a sudden we have a future statement)? If so, what exactly is being asserted, since this "it" doesn't refer to anything specific?

Let's take another sentence, "if you break it, you buy it" which a store uses as a general rule. Are you really going to tell me there's any implication, because of the alleged definiteness of "it", that someone will break it, even though it's not clear at all what "it" is?



> One way by which Smyth distinguishes between particular and general “functions” is the use of the indefinite pronoun (2298--deja vu pas plus! ). The presence of the indefinite pronoun makes a sentence more general in terms of “function”:
> 
> if it happens = εἰ συμβαίνει
> if anything ever happens = ἐάν τι συμβῇ


First of all, in non-general statements, εἰ συμβαίνει would be translated "if it happening" -- do you not realize that "it happens" in English is a general statement, or do you deny that as well?

And anyway, the relevance of this comment is? Is there anything to suggest that a majority of general conditions have τις in them?



> As I see it, “it” is more definite than “anything”, and la italianilla wrote “if it happens...” not “if anything happens.” What is more, this “it” refers not to just anything, but to something more definite, namely the “seemingly impossible things”. The use of the plural doesn’t negate the definite “it” for me:
> 
> Smyth 2293 “A particular condition refers to a definite act or to several definite acts occurring at a definite time or at definite times.”


I repeat my simple question: which _definite_ acts? Then how do you explain the math example I gave, which doesn't talk about just anything but something more definite, namely "pairs of equals"?

And what exactly do you mean by "'it' refers ... to ... 'seemingly impossible things'"? It's nonsense to claim that "seemingly impossible things" is the antecedent of "it" (since clearly the statement does not say "(the class of) seemingly impossible things is possible").



> It’s also significant that Smyth uses the word “ever” to translate the subtle difference between the simple condition and present general condition, which is also the difference between the indicative and the subjunctive:
> 
> εἰ συμβαίνει = if it happens
> ἐάν συμβῇ = if it ever happens


Smyth sometimes uses "ever", and in some of his examples, it doesn't even seem possible to put in an ever, and in some cases where it is possible (the math example again) it completely misrepresents the meaning of the Greek.



> This suggests to me that the indicative is not “neutral” vis-a-vis the subjunctive in these conditions; an act seems more "definite" in the indicative.


I have no idea what you mean by "definite" here -- do you mean fulfilled? That then would be false. It's easy to find example with the indicative like εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων.



> Honestly, I don't think even Smyth himself or the ancient grammarians for that matter had this understanding of "general" in mind when they wrote their tomes.


So what do you think he means by "general"?


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## wonderment

modus.irrealis said:


> Just so that no one is misled by that, I have to mention that these are not the only possibilities -- the imperfect indicative in the protasis can be used for the past, and the aorist indicative + ἄν used in the apodosis for the past, not to mention that the pluperfect can be used as well.


As I have no intention of misleading anyone, let me cite Smyth’s discussion of contrary-to-fact conditions more fully:



> §2292. _Only one class of conditional sentences_ [i.e. contrary-to-fact] _distinctly expresses non-fulfilment of the action._
> 
> 
> Present or Past: (protasis) εἰ + imperfect indicative, (apodosis) ἄν + imperfect indicative.
> 
> εἰ ταῦτα ἐποίεις, καλῶς ἂν ἐποίεις if you were (now) doing this, you would be doing well; if you had been doing this, you would have been doing well.
> 
> 
> Past: (protasis) εἰ + aorist indicative, (apodosis) ἄν + aorist indicative.
> 
> εἰ ταῦτα ἐποίησας, καλῶς ἂν ἐποίησας if you had done this, you would have done well.
> 
> 
> _Greek has no special forms to show that an action is or was fulfilled, however clearly this may be implied by the context._



My point remains: it is ἄν that marks these conditions as contrary-to-fact; without it you would have a simple condition: (protasis) εἰ + indicative, (apodosis) indicative. 

In addition, Smyth’s comments about non-fulfilment seem to contradict Rijksbaron’s assertions which you cited. And unless I have Rijksbaron’s complete text in front of me (which I don’t) it’s hard for me to assess the snippets you quoted. To be honest, I find Smyth a more reliable guide.



> Oh noes, I didn't list every meaning of τις -- and τις is how you say "a certain" in Greek:


Just so we’re thorough, and clear that τις is an indefinite pronoun: entry in Lewis and Short. In the context you cited at post #18, τις is an indefinite pronoun “anyone”. 



> First of all, in non-general statements, εἰ συμβαίνει would be translated "if it happening" -- do you not realize that "it happens" in English is a general statement, or do you deny that as well?


I’m glad you asked. “To do” is a non-stative verb, and Smyth seems to have no problem using “you do” in a present simple condition, or translating εἰ ποιεῖς as “if you do” rather than “if you’re doing.” Smyth 2291: εἰ ταῦτα ποιεῖς, καλῶς ποιεῖς  (if you do this, you do well). And come to think of it, this seems very similar to la italianilla’s sentence.

Smyth 2291: present simple condition (εἰ + indicative)
εἰ ταῦτα ποιεῖς, καλῶς ποιεῖς  (if you do this, you do well)

Smyth 2295: present general condition (ἐάν + subjunctive)
ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῇς (ποιήσῃς), σὲ ἐπαινῶ (if ever you do this, I always praise you).

At this point, I feel that I’m just repeating myself, and that our conversation is turning argumentative rather than productive. Perhaps we could just agree to disagree...


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## modus.irrealis

wonderment said:


> At this point, I feel that I’m just repeating myself, and that our conversation is turning argumentative rather than productive. Perhaps we could just agree to disagree...


Of course .


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## orthophron

I have already given possible solutions with the use of relative-conditional sentences in my previous post:
τό συμβαίνειν γίγνεσθαι σημαίνει τό ἐξεῖναι -> to happen to occur means to be possible [to occur].
ὃ συμβαίνει/γίγνεται, [δῆλόν ἐστι ὃτι] δυνατόν ἐστι. -> what happens, [it is clear that it] is possible.
ὃ συμβαίνει δηλοῖ ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστι. -> what happens makes it clear that it is possible.
ὃ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, έξεστι [γίγνεσθαι]. ("ὃ" is in accusative here) -> what happens to occur is possible [to occur].
ὃ συμβαίνει/γίγνεται, [δῆλόν ἐστι ὃτι] δυνατόν ἐστι. what happens [it is clear that it] is possible.
The above sentences denote something "certain and real" as classified in greek documentation.

I 'll cite now the –ever option using relative-conditional sentences.
The following sentences denote the “unlimited repetition in present and future”.

ὃ δ’ ἂν συμβαίνῃ, δῆλον ὃτι δυνατόν OR:
ὃ δ’ ἂν συμβαίνῃ δυνατόν εστί δῆλον ὃτι. ("δῆλον ὃτι" at the end means "obviously"). -> whatever happens is obviously possible (in present or future).
ὃ δ’ ἂν συμβῇ, δῆλον ὃτι δυνατόν.-> whatever happens (in future) it is clear that it is possible.

The sense of ever, -ever is inherent in ἐάν/ἂν/ἢν + subjunctive or relative pron/adverb + ἂν + subjunctive.
ἂν + subjunctive -> mostly translated as whenever …
relative pron/adv + ἂν + subjunctive ->if by any chance … (if refering to the whole phrase) or –ever … (if refering to a particular word).

Present tense (indicative) in greek denotes a general truth, continuous and habitual actions.
Present’s subjunctive maintains these aspects and may refer to present or future.
Aorist’s subjunctive does not convey the sense of duration of action, considers the action finished and refers to future (in our case).

Some clarifications (if I may be allowed).
εἰ συμβαίνει 
a) εἰ συμβαίνει + infinitive -> if it happens that … (continuously or habitually)
b) εἰ + _noun_ συμβαίνει -> if _noun_ happens/is happening (continuously or habitually)
c) εἰ τι συμβαίνει -> if something happens/is happening (continuously or habitually)

"εἰ τι συμβαίνει" is equal to "ὃ συμβαίνει"
"εἰ" may sometimes be rendered by "since".

(ἐ)άν συμβῇ (aorist subjunctive)
a) (ἐ)άν συμβῇ + infinitive -> if it [ever] happens that ... (in future)
b) (ἐ)άν _noun_ συμβῇ -> if _noun_ [ever] happens (in future)
c) (ἐ)άν τι συμβῇ -> if something [ever] happens (in future)

"ἐάν τι συμβῇ" is equal to "ὃ δ’ ἂν συμβῇ"

(ἐ)άν συμβαίνῃ (present subjunctive)
ὃ δ’ ἂν συμβαίνῃ -> whatever happens/is happening (in present or future)

I don’t think we trying to find one single solution. For example the ancient motto "fortune favours the bold" can be found in two versions: "τοῖς τολμῶσιν η τύχη ξύμφορος" or "τοῖς τολμῶσιν φίλον ἐστί τύχη".They may be exactly the same in meaning but what I 'd like to say is we 're just trying to construct a clear, meaningful, grammatically correct sentence.

Oh! I didn't know there's a word limit.


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## la italianilla

I just want to say that I'm not going to shut your discussion off, just want to thank you for your explanations...

Bye!


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